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Abstract
OAuth is the new de facto standard for delegating au-
thorization in the web. An important limitation of OAuth is
the fact that it was designed for authorization and not for
authentication. The usage of OAuth for authentication thus
leads to serious vulnerabilities as shown by Zhou et. al. in
[44] and Chen et. al. in [9]. OpenID Connect was created on
top of OAuth to fill this gap by providing federated identity
management and user authentication. OpenID Connect was
standardized in February 2014, but leading companies like
Google, Microsoft, AOL and PayPal are already using it in
their web applications [1], [2], [3], [30].
In this paper we describe the OpenID Connect protocol
and provide the first in-depth analysis of one of the key
features of OpenID Connect: the Discovery and the Dynamic
Registration extensions. We present a new class of attacks on
OpenID Connect that belong to the category of second-order
vulnerabilities. These attacks consist of two phases: First,
the injection payload is stored by the legitimate application.
Later on, this payload is used in a security-critical operation.
Our new class of attacks – called Malicious Endpoints
attacks – exploits the OpenID Connect extensions Discov-
ery and Dynamic Registration. These attacks break user
authentication, compromise user privacy, and enable Server
Side Request Forgery (SSRF), client-side code injection, and
Denial-of-Service (DoS). As a result, the security of the
OpenID Connect protocol cannot be guaranteed when these
extensions are enabled in their present form.
We contacted the authors of the OpenID Connect and
OAuth specifications. They acknowledged our Malicious
Endpoint attacks and recognized the need to improve the
specification [29]. We are currently involved in the discus-
sion regarding the mitigation of the existing issues and an
extension to the OAuth specification.
1. Introduction
Single Sign-On (SSO). SSO protocols like SAML, OpenID
or OpenID Connect replace multiple manual authentications
at different Service Providers (SPs) with a single manual
authentication at an Identity Provider (IdP), and multiple
REST-based messages invisible to the End-User. An IdP
manages identities of multiple End-Users, provides specific
authentication mechanisms (e.g., username/password or 2-
factor), and creates authentication tokens about authenti-
cated End-Users. These authentication tokens are consumed
by an SP granting or denying access to the End-User in
dependence of the token verification.
Security of SSO. Many known attacks on SSO systems
only tamper with one protocol step and achieve the desired
results in the following step. For example, replay-attacks,
or attacks manipulating the token directly or sending it to
a different SP [17], [20], [32], [41] – they all achieve their
attack goals in a single protocol request/response pair. We
thus classify these vulnerabilities as first-order vulnerabili-
ties, since they can be detected by only checking a single
control flow. Modern analyzing tools like SSOScan [44],
AuthScan [5] and InteGuard [43] are able to detect such
first-order vulnerabilities but are limited to one protocol or
cover only a small subset of existing attacks.
A more general approach is the automated analysis of
SSO protocols, which remains a future challenge: Only
the relatively simple flows of the SAML SSO protocol
have been analyzed with protocol analyzers [17]. Sun et
al. in 2012 [35] and Fett et al. in 2014 [15] proposed a
formal model for analyzing OpenID and Browser ID, but
admit that the protocols are far too complex to be analyzed
automatically.
Summarized, previous work concentrated on first-order
vulnerabilities in SAML [17], [20], [32], OpenID [24], [40],
[35], OAuth [9], [34] and Facebook Connect [21], [44], but
the OpenID Connect protocol and especially its extensions
have not been investigated so far.
OpenID Connect. OpenID Connect is a new SSO protocol
released in February 2014. It is the successor of OpenID and
it is based on OAuth, but uses several ideas from OpenID.
The key feature of OpenID — the dynamic and fully
automatic open trust establishment between IdP and SP —
is also present in the OpenID Connect protocol by means of
the Discovery and Dynamic Registration extensions. Open
in the context of SSO means that users can be logged
into an SP even if the user’s IdP is not known to the SP
beforehand. A user can simply submit its identity on the SP,
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which is usually a URL (e.g., https:// IdP.com/alice) or an
email address (e.g., alice@Idp.com). Based on this identity
the SP discovers the responsible IdP (e.g., https:// IdP.com/ )
and retrieves all information needed for the authentication.
Afterwards, the SP dynamically registers on the discovered
IdP and establishes a trust relationship to be able to (retrieve
and) verify the authentication tokens used later on in the
SSO protocol flow.
During Discovery and Dynamic Registration, SP and
IdP communicate directly with each other (server-to-server
communication), so these protocol messages cannot be mon-
itored by the End-User.
Second-Order Vulnerabilities in OpenID Connect.
Second-order vulnerabilities have been described and de-
tected in the context of web applications [7], [11], [27].
Speaking of second-order vulnerabilities in SSO protocols
in general we have the same execution scheme: (1.) The
injection of the attack vectors is allowed by the specification
and protocol flow. Thus, no implementation or configuration
flaws are required. (2.) The execution of the protocol can
proceed as usual without any incidents. (3.) The attack
vectors are loaded and lead to successful execution of the
attack.
Analyzing and detecting second-order vulnerabilities in
distributed systems like SSO is more complex than in web
applications, because they are including multiple phases,
plethora messages, parameters and participants. This makes
detection significantly more complex. We are not aware of
any previous work and any automated security tools capable
to detect such vulnerabilities.
Malicious Endpoint Attacks. The concept of our Malicious
Endpoint attacks abuses a weakness in the Discovery and
Dynamic Registration extensions of the OpenID Connect
protocol to initially store the payload on the SP and execute
it in another step. The main reason for this is that an SP
can be forced to start a Discovery on an attacker-controlled
webserver, which returns attacker-chosen information. This
information contains URL parameters that can be used for
different threats. For instance we could use them to start
Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) targeting the internal
network behind the SP, execute Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attacks by forcing the SP to download huge data files, start
code injection attacks, and even broke the user authentica-
tion on the SP — we were able to steal the user’s SSO
token.
Our Contribution.
I We are the first providing an in-depth security anal-
ysis of the OpenID Connect features Discovery and
Dynamic Registration.
I We identified serious second-order vulnerabilities and
developed a new class of attacks called Malicious
Endpoints attacks, which exploit a lack in the OpenID
Connect specification resulting in SSRF, DoS, and
authentication flaws.
I We propose countermeasures to prevent our attacks,
and discuss their respective advantages and disadvan-
tages. The integration of our countermeasures are cur-
rently discussed with the authors of the specification.
I We provide a public available online website that can
be used by SPs for verifying the security against our
Malicious Endpoint attacks.1
Our results show that protocol extensions must be designed
with extreme care, and their security implications have to
be discussed thoroughly. Otherwise, they can lead to serious
attacks with critical impact, even in secure standards.
The Discovery and Dynamic Registration are optional
extensions. Four libraries are officially certified to specific
conformance profiles and interoperability [16]. We success-
fully verified our attacks against two of them: MITREidCon-
nect and phpOIDC. However, it must be considered that our
Malicious Endpoints attack targets on the OpenID Connect
specification itself and not on a specific implementation.
Thus, any implementation using the Discovery and Dynamic
Registration extensions is vulnerable against the class of
Malicious Endpoints attacks.
2. Modern SSO Protocols
Since their establishment in the early 1980s, protocols
like Kerberos (first officially published in 1987 as Version
4 [22]) and the corresponding concepts of delegated authen-
tication and authorization using Trusted Third Partys (TTPs)
have been constantly developed and refined into modern
SSO protocols. These protocols aim at being compliant with
the requirements of the modern and flexible Internet infras-
tructure. Mainly, modern SSO protocols strive to achieve the
following goals:
(1) Decentralization – SSO appears to be centralized
embracing only a very small set of fixed TTPs. The most
widely known of these TTPs are Facebook and Google.
However, exporting data and outsourcing infrastructure to
companies like Facebook and Google can include certain
security risks and trust issues.
Luckily, modern protocols like OAuth, SAML,
BrowserID, OpenID and OpenID Connect are designed and
specified to set up custom TTPs, which act independently
from each other. This enables companies to set up their
own TTPs and use these for authentication purposes instead
of having to rely on external providers.
(2) Trust Establishment – Every SP has to establish a
trust relationship with the TTP. In order to do this, key
material has to be exchanged. An important requirement
for modern SSO protocols is that this process occurs with
minimal configuration, implementation, and installation ef-
fort. In the best case, the trust establishment should work
automatically.
1. The website does not provide any tests against DoS and SSRF attacks
in order to avoid misuse.
2.1. OpenID Connect
The OpenID Connect protocol efficiently addresses the
goals stated above – it is decentralized and allows automated
trust establishment without any configuration effort or user
interaction.
OpenID Connect was designed on basis of the OAuth
framework [31] in order to enable the authentication of
End-Users without changing the OAuth protocol flow. Thus,
OAuth capabilities are integrated with the protocol it-
self [36], providing OpenID Connect with the capability of
delegated authorization.
Additionally, OpenID Connect also incorporates con-
cepts utilized by another SSO protocol – OpenID [39]. Such
concepts are the Discovery and Dynamic Registration of
OpenID Providers (OPs). The Discovery process allows an
SP to automatically discover new OPs without any con-
figuration and user interaction. The Dynamic Registration
enables the on-the-fly registration and trust establishment
between a Client and OP, also without any user interaction.
A major advantage of OpenID Connect is its integration
into existing applications: OpenID Connect was designed to
be easily integrated into current OAuth compliant systems,
with only minimal extensions to the already available OAuth
APIs.
2.2. Roles
Within the OpenID Connect protocol, three different
parties each assuming a different role can be found. The
relationship between the different roles can be seen in
Figure 1.
accesses 
services
authenticates,
grants access
issues tokens & claims
delegates authentication,
requests tokens & claims
End-User
Client OpenID Provider
Figure 1: Role Relationship within the OpenID Connect
protocol [36, Section 1.3]
The End-User, represented by his user agent (UA),
wants to access selected services of a Client. Therefore, he
needs to prove his identity to the Client. Additionally, the
End-User has the possibility to authorize the Client to access
a specific set of his resources stored on the OP.
The Client is an application providing a certain ser-
vice, which requires authentication of an End-User. This
authentication process is delegated to the corresponding OP.
Therefore, the Client requests an authentication token signed
by OP, which proves the identity of the End-User. Op-
tionally, the Client can also request authorization to access
certain protected resources of the End-User stored on OP,
for example, photos.
Please note that the term “Client” according to OpenID
Connect terminology denotes an SP according to the com-
mon SSO terminology – a service, which can be accessed by
the End-User. In order to be compliant to the terminology
within the OAuth and OpenID Connect specification, we
will use the term “Client” from now on.
The OpenID Provider (OP) acts as a TTP/IdP towards
Client and End-User, handles End-User authentication and
issues an authentication token containing a specific set of
claims proving the identity of the End-User. Additionally,
an authorization token can be issued, in order to authorize
the Client to access End-User’s resources.
2.3. OP Endpoints
Within the OpenID Connect Core specification [36] the
following endpoints on the OP are defined and their relation
to the according SSO phases is depicted in Figure 2:
(1.) Registration Endpoint (regEndp): In order to use
OpenID Connect services for authentication, a Client
has to register on the OP. For this registra-
tion, the Client accesses this URL regEndp, e.g.,
https://google.com/register.
(2.) Authorization Endpoint (authEndp): In order to execute
the Authentication Request of the Client, the End-User
has to be redirected to the authEndp of the OP, e.g.,
https://login.google.com/. Here, the End-
User has to authenticate to the OP via a corresponding
authentication process and authorize the Client to ac-
cess the requested resources.
(3.) Token Endpoint (tokenEndp): The Client
communicates with the tokenEndp, e.g.,
https://google.com/consume-token,
in order to obtain the id_token described in
Section 2.5 and authenticate the End-User. In addition,
an access_token can be sent to the Client in order
to authorize the access to restricted resources. This
communication is done directly between Client and
OP (without involving the End-User).
(4.) UserInfo Endpoint (userinfoEndp): returns information
about the authenticated End-User like email, address,
phone, gender etc. In order to access the resources
the Client uses an Access Token obtained through the
OpenID Connect authentication.
2.4. Information Flow
OpenID Connect contains three phases, as shown in
Figure 2. In this section we explain the information flow
during the different phases.
Phase 1: Client Registration. The Client initially com-
municates with the OP’s registration endpoint (regEndp).
It submits the domain(s), where the Client is deployed,
  Phase 3: User Authentication on the Client; Access to resources
  Phase 1: Client Registration
regEndp authEndp tokenEndp
End-User
Client
(https://honestClient.com)
Honest OP
(https://honestOP.com)
1.1. Registration request: {redirect_uri, supported algorithms ...}
1.2. Registration response: {client_id, client_secret, timestamps}
  Phase 2: User Authentication on the OP and Client Authorization
2.1. Authorization Request
2.2. Consent/authorization
2.3. Code Flow: {Authorization Code}; Implicit Flow: {Access Token and ID Token}
userInfoEndp
3.1. Code Flow: {Authorization Code}, Client Authentication: {client_id/client_secret}
3.2. Code Flow: {Access Token and ID Token}
3.4. (Optional) UserInfo Response
3.3. (Optional) Access Token
Figure 2: Information flow in OpenID Connect containing three phases: Client Registration, User Authentication on the OP
and Client Authorization, and User Authentication on the Client.
for example https://clientA.com. The OP then generates a
random client_id/ client_secret pair, stores them
both together with the domain as a triplet, and sends the
credentials to the Client. The Client stores the same infor-
mation in order to use it during phases 2 and 3.
The Client’s registration is mostly processed only once
and is usually done via the web interface of the OP, for
example by the domain administrator or the developer of the
Client. Thus, the registration needs user interaction, causes
management overhead, and cannot be executed automati-
cally.
Phase 2: User Authentication on the OP. In the context of
delegated authentication the Client redirects unauthenticated
End-Users to the Authorization service endpoint on the
OP (authEndp). Subsequently, the End-User authenticates
to the OP using his credentials. Then, the OP generates an
authorization code and sends it to the End-User. The code
is an intermediary between the End-User and the Client. By
sending the code to the Client, the End-User authorizes the
Client to access restricted resources.
Once received, the Client uses the code to retrieve the
authentication token (id_token), containing user’s iden-
tity, and optionally the access_token granting access to
restricted resources.
Phase 3: User Authentication on the OP – ID and Access
Token. Once the Client receives the code, it sends it to the
Token Service endpoint on the OP (tokenEndp). In the same
message, the Client sends its credentials (client_id and
client_secret, cf. Phase 1) and authenticates to the
OP.
The OP responds with the id_token and possibly
the (optional) access_token. Once the id_token is
received, the Client verifies it and subsequently authenticates
the End-User.
The optional access_token is part of the OAuth
protocol flow and it authorizes the Client to access restricted
resources of the End-User on the OP.
2.5. ID Token
The OpenID Connect protocol is basically an extension
of OAuth by adding an id_token. The id_token is a
security token containing claims about the identity of an
End-User by an OP, proving the End-User’s identity to a
Client. Its data structure is represented as a JSON Web
Token (JWT) [19]. In order to provide authenticity as well
as integrity of the token, the OP is responsible for signing
it using JSON Web Signature (JWS) [18].
1 Header: { "alg": "HS256" }
2 Body: {
3 "iss": "http://openidConnectProvider.com/",
4 "sub": "user1",
5 "exp": 1444148908,
6 "iat": 1444148308,
7 "nonce": "40c6b33b9a2e",
8 "aud": "http://client.com/",
9 }
10 Signature: AF45JF93LKD76D....
Listing 1: An example of ID Token as JSON object.
A signed id_token consist of three parts: Header,
containing information regarding the used cryptographic
algorithms, Body, including information needed for the au-
thentication of an End-User, and Signature providing the
authenticity and integrity of the id_token.
Identity of the End-User. The identity of the user consists
of two parts: (1.) issuer and (2.) subject. The issuer
(cf. Listing 1: iss, Line 3) is a mandatory identity claim
identifying the originator (the OpenID Provider) of the
id_token, for example https://www.myOpenIDProvider.
com. The subject (sub, Line 4) is a mandatory iden-
tity claim that specifies the End-User’s identifier and is
consumed by the Client. Issued by the OpenID Provider
(issuer), it has to be locally unique and never reassigned
(e.g., alice@myOpenIDProvider.com). It is essential
to note that both values – issuer and subject – must
be used to uniquely identify the End-User.
Timestamps and Freshness. The claims timestamp
(iat, Line 6) and expired (exp, Line 5) define the
creation and expiration times of the token. The nonce
(Line 7) claim is a randomly chosen String value, sent by
the Client within the Authentication Request and passed
through unmodified to the id_token, used to mitigate
replay attacks.
Audience Restrictions. The audience (aud, Line
8) is a mandatory claim specifying the audience(s)
that this id_token is intended to be used for (e.g.
https://clientA.com). It must, at least, contain the
client_id of the Client which requests the token.
3. Security Model
This section will give a detailed description of the se-
curity model used in the analysis of the OpenID Connect
protocol.
3.1. Assumptions
We make the following assumptions for the analyzed
systems:
I Secure TLS channels: A huge proportion of the security
of OpenID Connect is based on the assumption that
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is used to secure the
communication between the involved parties. Naturally,
we follow this approach and assume the corresponding
TLS channels to be secure.
I Uncompromised software: All software used by the
End-User is assumed to be uncompromised. This espe-
cially holds for the user agent and the operating system
– we assume that no malicious web browser plugins
and that no keyloggers etc., are active on the End-
User’s system. We additionally assume that the Client
and the OP can also not be compromised. For example,
we assume that we do not have any other access except
for their publicly available website (e.g. we do not have
shell access).
I No impersonation towards the End-User: The attacker
controls his own webservers and services, but we as-
sume that he does not impersonate legitimate web
applications. We thus assume that the End-User can
neither be tricked into accepting attacker generated
TLS certificates as valid certificates for genuine Clients,
nor will the End-User react to Phishing mails claiming
to originate from the legitimate Client.
In short, we assume the attacker must not able to
impersonate a legitimate Client towards the End-User
in any meaningful way.
3.2. Capabilities of the Attacker
The attacks to-be-introduced in this work have been
strictly verified in the web attacker model [6]. In contrast
to the network-based attacker model (also called the crypto-
graphic attacker model), the web attacker does not have full
control over the network and thus is unable to eavesdrop on
or manipulate network connections.
He is, however, able to use a UA or a custom HTTP
client to send arbitrary HTTP requests to every publicly
available web application in the web (including the Client
and the OP) and subsequently receive its responses.
For tests within live implementations the attacker is able
to register as many accounts on a specific Client or OP as
he wishes.
Furthermore, the attacker can use links (e.g., sent via
email) or web-blog commentaries to lure the victim into
opening a (manipulated) Uniform Resource Identifier (URI)
to, for example, conduct CSRF attacks.
3.3. Attacker Goals
The scope of this paper are attacks against the End-User
and attacks against the Client.
Attacking the End-User. Attacks on the End-User are
focusing on token theft. In OpenID Connect, there are
three different tokens: The code, the id_token and the
access_token. Leakage of any of them can allow an
attacker to get unauthorized access to restricted resources.
Attacking the Client. Attacks on the Client have different
surfaces and can be categorized in two groups.
The first group contains impersonation attacks. In Phase
1 of the OpenID Connect protocol – during the registration
– the Client receives the client_id and the client_-
secret. Both parameters are used for the Client’s authen-
tication to the OP. If these credentials are compromised, the
attacker can use them to impersonate the Client. In Phase
2 of the protocol, the Client receives at least one token. An
attacker can then send manipulated tokens to the Client in
order to impersonate different End-Users.
The second group contains classical attacks on web
applications. These attacks include DoS techniques as well
as code injection attacks, like XSS or SQL-Injection. Please
note that in our work, we consider this group of attacks only
in conjunction of the OpenID Connect protocol. Thus, only
attacks that are directly initiated through protocol messages
are investigated.
4. Gap in Security Evaluations
By considering previous work regarding the security of
SSO protocols, we observed that its analysis concentrates
on Phase 2 and Phase 3 [34], [44], [9]. Concentrating on
those two phases seems plausible, because the End-User
authenticates in Phase 2 and the authentication tokens are
transmitted in Phase 3. An attacker targeting Phase 2 or
Phase 3 can achieve one or more of the goals defined
in Section 3.3. As a result, previous work only revealed
security vulnerabilities in Phase 2 and Phase 3. These were
fixed and the specification was changed [9].
Nevertheless, the entirety of Phase 1 has not been con-
sidered so far. This is reasoned by the fact that the Client
Registration and Key Transport between Client and OP are
usually executed manually. For instance, the developer of a
Facebook App has to visit his Facebook developer website,
and click on create new App. Facebook will then generate a
client_id and a client_secret. The developer then
copies them into his App configuration manually.
In contrast to this manual execution, protocols like
OpenID and OpenID Connect can also execute the Client
Registration automatically. Especially for OpenID Connect,
this issue is addressed by introducing a new approach for the
Client registration: The so called Dynamic Registration [38]
allows registration to be automatic, transparent and without
any user interaction. However, an important security ques-
tion raised about this development is: How does this feature
affect the security of the protocol?
5. Second-Order Vulnerabilities in OpenID
Connect
In this section we first describe the OpenID Connect
extensions Discovery and Dynamic Registration in detail.
Then, we present security considerations regarding the usage
of the both phases. Based on the security considerations
we introduce the concept of a novel class second-order
vulnerabilities in SSO.
5.1. OpenID Connect: Discovery and Dynamic
Client Registration
The information flow during the automated Client Regis-
tration is shown in Figure 3. Initially, the End-User submits
his identity, for example alice@honestOP.com, to the Client.
In order to initiate the SSO authentication, the Client needs
to discover the corresponding OP controlling the identity of
Alice.
Phase 1.1. The Client uses the provided identity and ex-
tracts the domain name of the OP [37, Section 2.1]. In
our example, Alice’s identity is controlled by the domain
honestOP.com. The domain name uniquely identifies the
corresponding Discovery endpoint2.
The Client sends an HTTP request to this Discovery
endpoint and subsequently retrieves the OP’s configuration
information including its endpoint locations: The (Dynamic)
Registration Endpoint (regEndp), the Authorization End-
point (authEndp), the Token Endpoint (tokenEndp) and fur-
ther endpoints (c.f., Section 2.3).
Phase 1.2. In Phase 1.2 (Dynamic Registration) the
Client can automatically register at the OP. For that
purpose, the Client sends its own URL, for example
http://client.com, to the regEndp URL. The OP
responds with a client_id/ client_secret pair. Fi-
nally, the Client and the OP store the credentials in their
respective databases and use them during the next phases.
5.2. Influence of the Discovery phase on the
OpenID Connect flow
By analyzing the Discovery and Dynamic Registration
phases we make the following observations:
I The usage of any OPs is supported by the OpenID Con-
nect protocol without any pre-configuration, installation
or manual interaction (neither on the Client nor on the
User-Agent). The End-User has to enter his identity
on the Client, e.g. bob@honestOP.com, in order to
start the authentication with his own OP.
I All discovered endpoints are URLs. No limitations are
specified that restrict these URLs to domains, subdo-
mains, or URL contexts.
Based on our observations, we discovered that we can
trigger any Client supporting Discovery and Dynamic Reg-
istration to use our custom OP for authentication. Thus, we
control the data sent to the Client and used in the following
phases of the protocol flow. In Figure 4 we present how the
retrieved information during the Discovery phase influences
the OpenID Connect phases.
Discovery
Client Honest OP
  Phase 1.1: Discovery
1.1.1. Discovery request: 
https://honestOP.com/.well-known/webfinger
1.1.2. Discovery response: {href, rel}
1.1.3. OpenID Connect Configuration request sent to href
1.1.4.  Response: OP Metadata 
{issuer, registration_endp, authorization_endp, token_endp, userinfo_endp, jwks_endp}
Phase 1: 
Client Registration
Phase 2:
User Authenitcation 
on OP
Phase 3: 
User Authentication 
on the Client
Figure 4: A detailed overview of the Discovery phase re-
vealing how the metadata received by the Client influences
the next OpenID Connect phases.
The first two messages are used to discover the URL
where the metadata of the OP is stored based on the
2. This is usually realized by applying a modifier to the domain, e.g.,
https://honestOP.com/.well-known/webfinger.
End-User
Phase 3: User  Authentication on the Client and Authorrization
Phase 2: User Authentication on OP and Successful Authentication Response
Phase 1.2: Dynamic Registration: client_id/client_secret 
   Phase 1.1: Discovery regEndp authEndp token/userInfo/jwks/-Endp
regEndp authEndp tokenEndp/
userInfoEndp/
jwksEndp
Discovery
issuer
Client
(https://honestClient.com)
Honest OP
(https://honestOP.com)
Figure 3: OpenID Connect Dynamic Registration
identity entered by and End-User. The Discovery request
(1.1.1) is an HTTP message sent to the OP’s discovery
service (e.g. https://honestOP.com/ .well-known/webfinger).
The response is a JSON message containing two param-
eters: (1.) href, which points to the metadata of the OP
and (2.) rel, which identifies the type of service (e.g.
http://openid.net/ specs/connect/1.0/ issuer).
Consequentially, a new HTTP request is sent to the URL
specified via the href parameter. The response contains the
metadata with all information regarding the OP: endpoints,
supported authentication flows, supported algorithms for
signing and encrypting messages, public keys of the OP
etc.
Figure 4 depicts the relation between the endpoints
received in the last messages of the Discovery phase and
the OpenID Connect phases. The regEndp will be used by
the Client in order to register the Client on the OP and
receive the client credentials (e.g. client_id/client_secret).
The authEndp points to the Authorization server respon-
sible for the authentication of the End-User. Noteworthy is
the fact that only the Authorization server is visible for the
End-User during the authentication. All other endpoints are
called by the Client directly and thus cannot be seen by the
End-User.
The next three endpoints tokenEndp, userInfoEndp and
jwksEndp are used in the last Phase (Phase 3) of the proto-
col: the End-User authentication.
5.3. Security considerations
OpenID Connect supports the usage of custom OPs.
For that purpose, a Client uses the Discovery and the Dy-
namic Registration Phase to retrieve the OP’s configuration
information including the endpoints regEndp, authEndp,
tokenEndp/userInfoEndp/jwksEndp and registers on it.
Please note that a malicious Discovery service can freely
choose all these parameters (cf., Phase 1.1 in Figure 3). By
this means, the malicious Discovery service can influence
(1.) on which URL the Client registers (regEndp), (2.) which
URL is used by the End-User to authenticate (authEndp),
(3.) and to which URL the token will be finally sent (toke-
nEndp/userInfoEndp).
5.4. Second-Order vulnerabilities in OpenID Con-
nect
Based on the security considerations, we developed a
new class of attacks referred to the second-order vulnera-
bilities. This new class differ from the class of conventional
second-order vulnerabilities in the context of XSS, SQL-
Injection and DoS. To clarify the difference we first explain
how second-order vulnerabilities are exploited in general
and then we introduce second-order vulnerabilities in dis-
tributed systems like SSO protocols.
Web application. Common second-order vulnerabilities in
web applications as shown in [11], [27] have only three
entities involved: (1.) the attacker acting with his browser,
(2.) the server hosting the web application and (3.) option-
ally another End-User (the victim). In case of DoS attacks
as shown in [27], there is no third entity involved, since the
victim is the server hosting the web application itself.
Figure 5 shows an example of a second-order vulnera-
bility on a web application.
User Input
β
β β
Placing Payload Execute Payload
Web Application
store β β
Web Application
use β
Figure 5: Data flow of a conventional second-order vulner-
ability on an web application. The attack vector β is first
placed, and later on executed leading to security issues.
During the first step, the user input containing an attack
vector will be stored in the database of a web application.
In this step, no attack, but its preparation will be processed.
Later on, the stored attack vector will be pulled from the
database and executed leading to an SQL-Injection, XSS or
even DoS.
OpenID Connect. Second-order vulnerabilities in SSO pro-
tocols are more complex than on web applications, since the
attack consists of multiple steps and messages exchanged
between different participants, for example, End-User and
Client, Client and OP, and End-User and OP. Due to the
nature of SSO, we have more entities: (1.) the End-User
who wants to login. This can be either a benign End-User
or the attacker; (2.) the Client which is the main target of
our attacks; (3.) a honest OpenID Provider (OP); (4.) an
attacker hosting his own service on the Internet. We will
use this service to host a malicious Discovery service later
on.
Figure 6 shows the data flow within a second-order vul-
nerability in a SSO protocol. Initially, the attacker stores the
attack vectors. The main difference is that the user input α is
not the attack vectors. α just starts the SSO authentication.
The injection of the attack vectors occurs during Phase 1
of the protocol – the Discovery phase within a Server-to-
Server communication. The attacker returns data used later
on during the protocol. In case of OpenID Connect this is
a metadata file containing endpoints of the OP, supported
protocol flows and supported cryptographic algorithms.
User Input
...
Server-to-Server
Phase 1 
Placing Payload Execute Payload
β1,... ,βn< >
β1,... ,βn< >
Discovery Service
Phase 1
Client
Phase 2
β1,... ,βi< >use
Client
Phase 3
β j , ... ,βn< >use
Client
Phase 1
α< >use
α
Figure 6: Data flow of a second-order vulnerability in
OpenID Connect. User’s input α triggers the authentication.
Within the Server-to-Server communication in Phase 1, the
attack vectors will be placed. These will be used later during
Phase 2 or/and Phase 3. Please note that the contacted
discovery services depends on the value of α.
Later on, the stored attack vectors β1, ..., βn will be
loaded. Please note that each attack vector can be used
during different SSO phases. Thus, β1, ..., βi are used during
Phase 2 of the protocol resulting. They can either lead
to successful completion of this phase or to an successful
attack. The further attack vectors βj , ..., βn will be used in
Phase 3 and lead to security issues.
To summarize, in Step 1 the attacker can place a harm-
less3 payload on the Client in such a way that the further
communication process between the participants is influ-
enced resulting in the following issues:
3. Harmless in this context means that the payload is not directly
executed.
(1.) The attacker gets access to resources owned by an
benign End-User (Section 6.1).
(2.) The attacker gather sensitive information regarding the
Client (Section 6.2)and thus breaking privacy?.
(3.) The attacker injects further attack vectors like XSS or
SQL-Injection (Section 6.3).
(4.) The further communication process between Client and
End-User or Client and OP is slowed down significantly
due to a DoS attack (Section 6.4).
6. Malicious Endpoints Attacks
This section describes four different attacks, which be-
long to the class of Malicious Endpoints attacks. All at-
tacks use the malicious Discovery service and influence the
OpenID Connect flow. Since each attack pursues different
goals, we describe for each attack the main goal, the setup
including the attacker model and the attack itself.
6.1. Broken End-User Authentication
The idea behind the attack is to influence the information
flow in the Discovery and Dynamic Registration Phase
in such a way that the attacker gains access to sensitive
information. The attacker pursues the theft of the credentials
between the honest OP and the honest Client. Additionally,
he steals a valid code authorizing the Client to access End-
User’s resources on the honest OP.
Setup. The basic setup for the attack is as follows:
I The End-User (victim) has an active account on the
genuine honest Client. We assume that the End-User
trusts this Client and the Client follows the OpenID
Connect protocol rules.
I The End-User is registered at the honest OP on the
domain https://honestOP.com. The End-User trusts this
OP and the OP also follows the OpenID Connect
protocol rules.
I To perform the attack, the attacker has to set up
his own Discovery service running on the domain
http://malicious.com. This Discovery Service acts ma-
liciously in that it deviates from the OpenID Connect
protocol flow as described in Figure 3. Note that there is
no need to disguise http://malicious.com as the regular
Discovery service belonging to the honest OP in any
way.
I According to the attacker model, the attacker does not
hold any control over the honest Client, the End-User,
the honest OP or the network traffic between these
instances. The attacker is able to send an HTTP request
through End-User’s browser, e.g. by embedding an im-
age in a benign HTML website that causes the browser
to automatically issue a request when the website is
viewed.
Attack description. In the following, we describe the attack
protocol flow, which we depicted in Figure 7.
Discovery
Client
(https://honestClient.com)
  Phase 1.1: Discovery
Steps 1.1.1 – 1.1.3
1.1.4.  Response: OP Metadata 
{issuer, registration_endp, authorization_endp, token_endp, userinfo_endp, jwks_endp}
tokenEndp/
userInfoEndp/
jwksEndp
Attacker‘s Webserver
(http://malicious.com)
Honest OP
(https://honestOP.com)
regEndp authEndp
End-User
Phase 1.2: Dynamic Registration 
Phase 2: User Authentication on OP
3.1. Code Flow: {Authorization Code}, Client Authentication: {client_id/client_secret}
3.3. (Optional) Access Token
Figure 7: Malicious Endpoints attack: Attacker’s Discovery service sets the endpoint variables in a specific way, such that
the secret tokens sent in the third phase are seamlessly distributed to the attacker’s server.
Phase 1.1 - Injecting malicious endpoints The attacker’s
intention in the first phase is to force a valid Client to use the
attacker’s malicious Discovery service. For this purpose, he
constructs a malicious link and stores it on a benign website,
e.g. in a web forum. For example, this can be a link to the
valid Client containing an identity alice@malicious.com.
issuer: http://malicious.com
regEndp: https://honestOP.com/register
authEndp: https://login.honestOP.com/
tokenEndp: http://malicious.com
userInfoEndp: http://malicious.com
Listing 2: Endpoints returned by the malicious Discovery
service
By visiting the website containing the malicious link, an
HTTP request will be sent to the Client through the End-
User’s (victim’s) browser. Consequentially, the Client starts
a discovery phase with the malicious Discovery service
http://malicious.com. The Client sends a request to deter-
mine the corresponding endpoints. The attacker’s Discovery
service responds with the following values, initiating the
actual attack:
Phase 1.2 – Dynamic Registration In the next step, the
Client accesses regEndp for the Dynamic Registration. It
sends a registration request to https://honestOP.com/register
and receives a client_id and client_secret in the response.
Note: The Client automatically starts the Dynamic Reg-
istration, even if it is already registered on the honest OP.
The reason for this behavior is that the Client believes
that http://malicious.com is the responsible OP, since it is
not known from previous authentication procedures. Thus,
http://malicious.com is a new OP for the Client and it starts
the registration procedure.
Phase 2 – End-User Authentication and Authorization
In the next phase, the Client redirects the End-User to
authEndp, https://login.honestOP.com/, where the End-User
has to authenticate himself and authorize the Client. The
End-User is not able to detect any abnormalities in the
protocol flow: Phase 1.1 and Phase 1.2 cannot be observed
by the End-User, and in Phase 2 the End-User will be
prompted to authenticate to the honest OP and authorize
the honest Client, both of which he knows and trusts. Thus,
the End-User authorizes the Client and the OP generates the
code, which is sent to the Client.
Note: Phase 2 exactly follows the original OpenID Con-
nect protocol flow – there are no parameter manipulations,
no redirects to malicious websites and no observation of
the network traffic between the End-User, the honest OP
and the Client. Thus, the attack started at the beginning of
the protocol flow can be neither detected nor prevented by
any of the participants at this point.
Phase 3 – The Theft In dependence of the protocol flow,
Code or Implicit, the messages sent to the attacker differ.
Within the Code flow the Client redeems the received
code from the previous phase: It sends the code together
with the corresponding Client’s credentials received during
the Dynamic Registration (client_id/ client_secret) to the
tokenEndp originally specified by the malicious Discovery
service – in this example http://malicious.com, see Listing 2.
Since the Implicit flow does not use the tokenEndp,
the attacker is not able to receive the information send in
phase 2. However, he can use another malicious endpoint –
userInfoEndp used in Step 3.3 in Figure 7 to retrieve further
information about the authenticated user. In the request, the
Client sends a freshly generated Access Token. As a result,
the attacker receives this Access Token and is able to access
the authorized resources on the OP.
6.2. Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
A SSRF attack describes the ability of an attacker to
create requests from a vulnerable web application to the
application’s Intranet and the Internet. Usually, SSRF is
used to attack internal services placed behind a firewall
and not accessible from Internet. In context of OpenID
Connect, the malicious Discovery service can be used to
start such attacks in order to (1.) gather information about
the Intranet infrastructure of the Client, and (2.) disseminate
attack vectors.
Setup. The attacker sets up a malicious Discovery service
returning endpoints called by the Client during the protocol
flow. The endpoints are URL strings specifying protocol
(http(s), ftp, smb etc.), port, path, and parameters. Since
there are no restrictions regarding the URLs, these can point
to the Intranet infrastructure of the Client. The Client will
use these URLs and performs HTTP GET requests on them.
In this manner, the Client can, for example, be enforced to
invoke internal REST-based web services. This capability
of the attacker is considered by the attacker model, since
the attacker is able to use his UA and send arbitrary HTTP
requests to every publicly available domain. Thus, he can
cause the Client to establish connection with the malicious
Discovery service.
Attack description. In comparison to the Malicious End-
point attack, now the attacker initiates the OpenID Connect
authentication on the Client by entering his identity (e.g.
oskar@malicious.com). Thus, no CSRF attack is needed. In
the end of the Discovery phase, the malicious Discovery
service returns the malicious endpoints called during the
different phases of the protocol. Previous researches reveal
how the execution of URLs can be used to (1.) connect and
execute commands on different services like Memcached,
(2.) Port scanning and (3.) data retrieving [4], [28].
6.3. Code Injection Attacks
User’s input sent through the web interface of the Client
is usually treated as untrusted and thus filtered to prevent
attacks like Cross-Site-Scripting (XSS) and SQL-Injection.
In order to bypass the existing filter an attacker can use other
channels to inject the attacks vectors – for instance within
the server-to-server communication in Phase 3.
Setup. The attacker configures his server to inject malicious
content in the messages returned in Step 3.2 (e.g. in the ID
Token) or in Step 3.4 (informations about the authenticated
user), which are sent to Client in Phase 3 (see Figure 2).
Please note that the ID Token and Access Token returned
by the malicious server are valid according to the specifica-
tion, since there are no restrictions regarding the values of
parameters like “sub”, “name” or “preferred_username”.
Attack description. Initially, the attacker starts the OpenID
Connect authentication on the Client by entering his identity
(e.g. oskar@malicious.com). He proceeds with the protocol
execution until Steps 3.1 and 3.3. The malicious server
then responds with valid tokens (ID Token and Access
Token) containing the attack vectors. A toy example of such
attack vector is shown in Listing 3 where an XSS attack
vector is injected into the field presenting the name of an
authenticated user in Step 3.4.
1 {
2 "sub":"90342.ASDFJWFA",
3 "name":"<script>alert(1)</script>",
4 "preferred_username":"admin",
5 "email":"bob@malicious.com",
6 "email_verified":true
7 }
Listing 3: An example of an XSS attack vector hidden
in the "name" filed within an Access Token.
Now, the placed XSS attack vector is stored in the web
application (persistent XSS). Other webpages on the client
will use it, for example on a guestbook page, and embed
the code, so that other page visitors get harmed. The same
schema can be used to place SQL-Injection attack vectors.
6.4. Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks
By applying DoS attacks the attacker allocates resources
on a Client and negatively affects its workflow. Such re-
sources are CPU usage, network traffic or memory. The
attack can target one or multiple of these resources during
the execution of DoS attack.
(a) Memory usage on the Client within 5 parallel OpenID Connect
authentication flows to an honest OP.
(b) Memory usage on the Client within 5 parallel OpenID Connect
authentication flows to a malicious Discovery service pointing to a
large file (in this case, we used a Debian Linux image file with
3.7GB).
Figure 8: Direct comparison between the memory usage
on the Client using (a) an honest OP and a (b) malicious
Discovery service.
Setup. The setup is similar to the SSRF attack – the attacker
sets up a malicious Discovery service returning endpoints
called by the Client during the protocol flow. The attacker
is able to use his UA and send HTTP request to the Client
causing the Client to establish connection with the malicious
Discovery service.
Attack description. An attack can be started by using a
malicious endpoint pointing to a large data file, which will
be downloaded. The Client calls later on the malicious
endpoint URL, allocates network resources as well as large
amount of the memory, which will be unnecessarily used.
We provide a measurement shown in Figure 8 on an
Apache Tomcat server with 1280 MB memory and 4x2.4
Ghz CPU. In Figure 8a we first measured the memory
usage on the Client within five parallel OpenID Connect
protocol runs with an honest OP. Once can say that almost
imperceptible changes in the memory consumption occur.
In Figure 8b we repeated the same tests, but this time we
used our malicious Discovery service pointing to a large
file. After few seconds, the memory usage increased almost
threefold. After 60 seconds, the Client was not accessible
for any incoming requests.
7. Implementation
We implemented a web service that is publicly available
on http:// ssoattacks.org/OIDC_MaliciousDiscoveryService/
and it can be used by Clients for verifying the security
against the attacks described in Section 6. In order to avoid
misuse we do not provide tests for DoS, SSRF and injection
attacks.
The service contains the following informations: (1.) At-
tack description presenting the main concept of Malicious
Endpoints. (2.) A Demo showing a normal OpenID Connect
flow and additionally the broken End-User authentication
attack described in Section 6.1. For that purpose we config-
ured an honest Client and an honest OP. The usage of own
Clients is supported by the service. (3.) The configuration
of the malicious Discovery service, enabling the view on
the used malicious endpoints. (4.) Database viewing all
collected credentials.
Testing Clients. Security auditors can test their Clients by
using our service. No pre-configuration or installation of any
software is needed.
In order to start the security evaluation, the auditor
has to enter the URL of our malicious Discovery ser-
vice on the target Client – http:// ssoattacks.org/OIDC_
MaliciousDiscoveryService/ . The Client calls the malicious
Discovery service and caches the metadata returned by it.
The metadata contains now the malicious endpoints. The
Client proceeds with the OpenID Connect protocol flow and
starts the next phases. At the end, the service prints out a
report that includes all stolen information, see Figure 9, for
example, the stolen code, access_token, id_token and Client
credentials. Security auditors can use it to test arbitrary
Clients and evaluate the impact of the attack.
We tested the Client applications of MITREidCon-
nect and phpOIDC and attacked them successfully with
our attacks. An online demo Client is also available
for testing, see run demo on http://ssoattacks.org/OIDC_
MaliciousDiscoveryService/.
Figure 9: The implementation collects all stolen tokens and
credentials and prints out a report containing the results.
Thus, security auditors can test their Clients and evaluate
the results of the tests.
8. Countermeasures
During our search for applicable countermeasures, we
tried to find a solution requiring minimal changes to the
protocol and to the existing implementations. In the follow-
ing, we present four possible countermeasures to our attacks
and discuss the advantages and disadvantages. Noteworthy
is the fact that each countermeasure mitigates only partially
the existing issues. Thus, a combination of the proposed
countermeasures is needed to improve the security on the
Client.
OPs Whitelisting. A suitable option to prevent the Mali-
cious Endpoints attack is to whitelist the allowed OPs on
Client side. By this means, an attacker will not be able to
start the authentication process with his Discovery service.
As shown in Figure 10, the administrator of the Client
should manually whitelist the URL of each OP when it re-
ceives a discovered URL in Step 1.1.2 (the href parameter).
If the whitelisting approach is applied suitable, the at-
tacker can only influence the first two messages of the
discovery phase. After Step 1.1.2, the Client compares the
returned href value with the stored values and breaks the
execution in case that the URL is unknown.
Whitelisting mitigates both the Malicious Endpoints and
the SSRF attack. This countermeasure however limits the
Discovery
Client Honest OP
  Phase 1.1: Discovery
1.1.1. Discovery request: 
https://honestOP.com/.well-known/webfinger
1.1.2. Discovery response: {href, rel}
1.1.3. OpenID Connect Configuration request sent to href
1.1.4.  Response: OP Metadata 
{issuer, registration_endp, authorization_endp, token_endp, userinfo_endp, jwks_endp}
Whitelist 
verification of 
„href“
Figure 10: A whitelist verification after Step 1.1.2. during
the Discovery phase. The returned href value is compared
with the entries in the database and in case that it is
whitelisted the Client proceeds with the Discovery.
flexibility of the Client and reduces the support of custom
OPs, which, depending on the according Client, could cause
problems. Additionally, the management overhead regarding
the provided whitelist can lead to further problems.
Endpoint Restrictions. A similar approach to prevent the
attack would be to restrict the possible contents of the
tokenEndp according to the contents of the authEndp. For
example, it could be required that the tokenEndp MUST be
located on the same domain as the authEndp and may only
differ in subdomain and/or path. This way, an honest Client
receiving a Discovery response can detect this attack and
abort the protocol.
Even though this countermeasure restricts the introduced
attack, it does not mitigate it completely. In case the at-
tacker runs his malicious Discovery service on the same
Infrastructure-as-a-Service cloud environment as the honest
OP, he could bypass this proposed countermeasure by using
the same domain or subdomain.
DoS protection. In order to prevent DoS the Client could
simply do an HTTP HEAD request — before doing a GET
request — and check the Content-Length HTTP header. In
this way, the Client can retrieve the size of the file. Please
note that this will only work on benign HTTP servers.
The attacker could prepare his own webserver that responds
with a wrong Content-Length header if a HEAD request
receives. To protect against this, the implementation should
stop downloading files after receiving a specified number of
Bytes (e.g. 5MB).
CSRF/Clickjacking protection. Our attack to break the
End-User authentication (cf. Section 6.1) requires the in-
jection of the malicious identity (e.g. alice@malicious.com)
in the first step, see Figure 7.
To prevent this kind of attack, we propose each client to
implement a proper CSRF4 and Clickjacking protection5.
Please note that this will only prevent the broken End-
User attack. SSRF, code injection, and DoS is still possible,
because for this kind of attacks, the attacker itself sends a
login request with alice@malicious.com.
4. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_
(CSRF)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet
5. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet
Client authentication via client_secret_jwt or pri-
vate_key_jwt. During the attack described in Section 6.1, the
attacker steals the client_id/client_secret of the Client in step
3.1 (see Figure 7). In order to mitigate the attack, the Client
can use alternatively the client_secret_jwt or private_key_jwt
flow for authentication in Phase 3 [36, Section 9]. Within
both flows, the Client does not send the client_secret through
the channel. The client signs a JSON message by using
either the client_secret or an asymmetric private key. The
OP verifies the message with the corresponding key and
authenticates the Client.
Just signing the message does not mitigate the at-
tack since the attacker can reply it on the honest toke-
nEndp. According to the specification the JSON message
includes an audience parameter specifying the URL of
the tokenEndp. During the attack the audience points to
http://malicious.com. Thus, the attacker can steal the code
and the signed JSON message, but he cannot replay them
on the honest tokenEndp since it will detect the different
values.
Please note that DoS and SSRF attacks are still possible
and should be considered by the implementation of the
Client.
Binding Discovery and Client Registration Phase. We
discussed our findings with the OAuth Working group. As
a result, the OAuth specification will be extended in such a
way that the Discovery phase is bound to the Authentication
Response sent in Phase 2. We depicted this approach in
Figure 11.
Discovery
Client Honest OP
  Phase 1.1: Discovery
1.1.1. Discovery request: 
https://honestOP.com/.well-known/webfinger
1.1.2. Discovery response: {href, rel}
1.1.3. OpenID Connect Configuration request sent to href URL
1.1.4.  Response: OP Metadata 
{issuer, registration_endp, authorization_endp, token_endp, userinfo_endp, jwks_endp}
authEndp
  Phase 2: User Authentication on the OP and Client Authorization
2.1. Authorization Request
2.2. Consent/authorization
2.3. Code Flow: {Authorization Code}; Implicit Flow: {Access Token and ID Token}  +  issuer
End-User
Figure 11: Binding Phase 1.1 (Discovery) and 2.3 (Authen-
tication Response) via the issuer element.
The protocol flow is the same to its current specification
with only one small change: In Step 2.3, we added the issuer
value as an additional parameter. Now, the Client is able to
detect the attack since the issuer in the Discovery document
is http://malicious.com (cf. Listing 2), but the honest OP
responds with its value https://honestOP.com.
This countermeasure requires a very small extension
of the current protocol flow and additional checks on the
OP, but in comparison to the previous approaches, it offers
the full flexibility of the Discovery and Dynamic Client
Registration extensions.
This countermeasure does not prevent DoS and SSRF
attacks and should be considered by the implementation of
the Client.
Summary. By implementing CSRF and Clickjacking coun-
termeasures on the Client the attack described in Section 6.1
will be mitigated. However, we believe that more general
and protocol-based solution should be provided by the
OpenID Connect specification. Thus, we prefer the coun-
termeasure binding the Discovery and Client Registration
Phase. Additionally, we advise the usage of both flows
client_secret_jwt or private_key_jwt for Client authentica-
tion avoiding the transmission of the client_secret between
the Client and the OP.
In order to reduce the impact of DoS attacks, the Client
should expect short messages. Thus, it can be configured to
wait small period for an answer and accepts messages less
than several KBytes. The Client should restrict the usage
of URLs, protocols and Ports in order to reduce the attack
surface of SSRF attacks. For instance only HTTP requests
with destination port 443 or 80 should be allowed.
9. Related Work
Attacks on SSO systems. In 2012, Wang et al. [41] concen-
trated on real-life SSO and the analysis of SSO protocols and
implementation flaws via Browser related messages (BRM).
The authors have well demonstrated the problems related to
token verification with different attacks. Additionally, they
introduced a tool named BRM-Analyzer, which analyses the
traffic passing through a user’s browser and detects abnor-
malities in the protocol flow, attempting to notice attacks.
However, since the Malicious Endpoints attack described in
this paper follows the protocol specification, no abnormali-
ties can be detected by tools like BRM-Analyzer. Moreover,
the BRM-Analyzer cannot observe the communication dur-
ing the Discovery and Dynamic Registration phase, since
the communication between Client and OP occurs directly
and not via the End-User’s browser.
In 2012, Sun et al. [34] analyzed nearly 100 OAuth
implementations, and found serious security flaws in many
of them. The research focused on the impact of classical
web attacks like XSS, CSRF and TLS misconfiguration
on the OAuth implementations. In [12], [13], [14], [25],
[26], [44], further attacks on OAuth implementations were
discovered and reported. However, all these works concen-
trated on individual attacks and especially implementation
misconfiguration.
In 2013, Wang et al. introduced a systematic process
for identifying critical assumptions in SDKs, which led to
the identification of exploits in constructed Apps resulting in
changes in the OAuth specification [42]. Chen et al. revealed
in 2014 serious vulnerabilities in OAuth applications on
mobile devices caused by the developer’s misinterpretation
of the OAuth protocol [9].
In 2014 Cao et. al. studied vulnerabilities in existing
SSO protocols that allow impersonation attacks and an-
alyzed the main reasons leading to these flaws [8]. The
authors concentrated only on phase 2 and phase 3 of the SSO
protocol flow and did not consider phase 1. Interestingly, the
authors of the paper recognized that one main problem in
SSO is the lack of authentication between the OP and Client,
which is part of the Malicious Endpoints attack.
Please note that none of the previous papers considers
the OpenID Connect protocol flow and the Discovery and
Dynamic Registration phases.
Formal approaches. An open problem that we see as
important future work (see below) is the introduction of
a formal language and an verifier tool that will be able
to automatically detect vulnerabilities as described in this
paper. In 2012 Sun et al. [35] provided a semi-automated
analysis on OpenID by modeling CSRF, replay, imper-
sonation, parameter forgery and session swapping attacks.
However, the authors did not consider that any of the OP’s
components can act maliciously (e.g. the Discovery service).
In 2014 Fett et al. [15] introduced a formalization for the
(now defunct) SSO service BrowserID. Nevertheless, in this
formal model they still perform a manual security analysis.
We refrain from modeling OpenID Connect in such
a formal model for two reasons: (1) We believe that a
thorough understanding of (second-order) vulnerabilities is
essential to developing a formal model for automated analy-
sis, and therefore concentrate on readability. (2) The model
from [15] depicts only BrowserID and thus has to be mod-
ified for each SSO protocol separately.
Second-order vulnerabilities. In 2014 Dahse et. al. in-
troduced an approach for static detection of second-order
vulnerabilities in web applications [11]. The authors con-
sidered attacks like SQL-Injection and XSS and methods to
prevent such vulnerabilities. More complex attacks including
multiple steps for injecting attack vectors and their execu-
tion in distributed systems interacting with each other were
not considered. One year later Olivo et.al. introduced new
class of DoS attacks referred to the second-order vulner-
abilities [27]. Additionally, the authors developed a static
analysis approach for detecting second-order DoS vulner-
abilities in web applications. More complex systems, for
example distributed systems like SSO, were not considered
and analyzed.
10. Discussion and Future Work
In this paper, we analyzed the OpenID Connect protocol
considering all phases of the protocol. During analyzing the
OpenID Connect’s the Discovery and Dynamic Registration
phases we found several novel second-order vulnerabilities
resulting in broken user authentication, DoS, SSRF and
injection attacks. Summarized, we found an existing gap in
previous security evaluations, since these concentrated only
on the security critical phases – Phase 2 and Phase 3.
Speaking of SSO, other protocols like OpenID [33,
Section 7.3], SAML [10] and BrowserID [23] support fea-
tures similar to the Discovery and Dynamic Registration
extensions described in OpenID Connect. It is essential that
these protocols are further studied to avoid similar security
gaps. We refer this research to the future work.
Second-order vulnerabilities in distributed systems like
SSO are barely studied. The explanation for this gap is the
complexity of such distributed systems. Since this complex-
ity has not yet been tamed by an automated analysis tool,
many of the SSO vulnerabilities today are discovered by
manual security evaluation, which is time consuming and
inefficient.
Developing such an automated analysis tool requires
deep knowledge of the distributed information flows in a
SSO system, and potential vulnerabilities. In this paper, we
aim to provide exactly this information for the novel and
important OpenID Connect SSO protocol, especially for the
discovery phase.
An important task in the future is the development of
techniques and automated tools facilitating the modeling,
evaluation and detection of security issues in distributed
systems like SSO. Currently, there is a gap, which should
be in the scope of further researches.
References
[1] Google Identity Platform: OpenID Connect (Mai 2015), https://
developers.google.com/identity/protocols/OpenIDConnect
[2] Integrate Log In with PayPal (Mai 2015), https://developer.paypal.
com/docs/integration/direct/identity/log-in-with-paypal/
[3] MIcrosoft Azure: OpenID Connect 1.0 (Mai 2015), https://msdn.
microsoft.com/de-de/library/azure/dn645541.aspx
[4] Alexander Polyakov, D.C.: Ssrf vs. business-critical
applications: Xxe tunneling in sap. BlackHat (2012),
https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Polyakov/BH_US_
12_Polyakov_SSRF_Business_Slides.pdf
[5] Bai, G., Lei, J., Meng, G., Venkatraman, S.S., Saxena, P., Sun, J.,
Liu, Y., Dong, J.S.: AUTHSCAN: Automatic extraction of web au-
thentication protocols from implementations. NDSS, February (2013)
[6] Barth, A., Jackson, C., Mitchell, J.C.: Securing frame communication
in browsers. Communications of the ACM - One Laptop Per Child:
Vision vs. Reality 52, 83–91 (June 2009), http://seclab.stanford.edu/
websec/frames/post-message.pdf
[7] Bau, J., Bursztein, E., Gupta, D., Mitchell, J.: State of the art: Au-
tomated black-box web application vulnerability testing. In: Security
and Privacy (SP), 2010 IEEE Symposium on. pp. 332–345. IEEE
(2010)
[8] Cao, Y., Shoshitaishvili, Y., Borgolte, K., Kruegel, C., Vigna, G.,
Chen, Y.: Protecting web-based single sign-on protocols against re-
lying party impersonation attacks through a dedicated bi-directional
authenticated secure channel. In: Stavrou, A., Bos, H., Portokalidis,
G. (eds.) Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses, Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, vol. 8688, pp. 276–298. Springer International
Publishing (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11379-1_14
[9] Chen, E., Pei, Y., Chen, S., Tian, Y., Kotcher, R., Tague, P.: OAuth
Demystied for Mobile Application Developers. In: Proceedings of the
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS).
ACM – Association for Computing Machinery (November 2014),
http://research.microsoft.com/apps/pubs/default.aspx?id=231728
[10] D. Poehn, S. Metzger, W.H.: Integration of dynamic automated
metadata exchange into the saml 2.0 web browser sso profile.
IETF, Internet Draft (December 16 2014), https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-poehn-dame-02
[11] Dahse, J., Holz, T.: Static detection of second-order vulnerabilities in
web applications. In: USENIX Security Symposium (2014)
[12] Egor Homakov: How we hacked Facebook with OAuth2 and
Chrome bugs (Februrary 2013), http://homakov.blogspot.ca/2013/02/
hacking-facebook-with-oauth2-and-chrome.html
[13] Egor Homakov: OAuth1, OAuth2, OAuth...? (March 2013)
[14] Egor Homakov: How I hacked Github again (Februrary 2014)
[15] Fett, D., Küsters, R., Schmitz, G.: Paper: An Expressive Model for
the Web Infrastructure: Definition and Application to the BrowserID
SSO System. In: 35th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
(S&P 2014). IEEE Computer Society (2014), to appear
[16] Foundation, O.: Openid certification (Mai 2015), http://openid.net/
certification/
[17] Groß, T.: Security analysis of the SAML single sign-on browser/ar-
tifact profile. In: Computer Security Applications Conference, 2003.
Proceedings. 19th Annual. pp. 298–307. IEEE (2003)
[18] Jones, M., Bradley, J., Sakimura, N.: JSON Web Signature (JWS)
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-30 (July 2014), http://tools.ietf.org/
html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-30
[19] Jones, M., Bradley, J., Sakimura, N.: JSON Web Token (JWT) draft-
ietf-oauth-json-web-token-25 (July 2014), http://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-25
[20] Mainka, C., Mladenov, V., Feldmann, F., Krautwald, J., Schwenk, J.:
Your software at my service: Security analysis of saas single sign-
on solutions in the cloud. In: Proceedings of the 6th Edition of the
ACM Workshop on Cloud Computing Security. pp. 93–104. CCSW
’14, ACM, New York, NY, USA (2014), http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/
2664168.2664172
[21] Miculan, M., Urban, C.: Formal analysis of Facebook Connect single
sign-on authentication protocol. In: SOFSEM. vol. 11, pp. 22–28
(2011)
[22] Miller, S.P., Neuman, B.C., Schiller, J.I., Saltzer, J.H.: Kerberos au-
thentication and authorization system. In: In Project Athena Technical
Plan. Citeseer (1987)
[23] Mozilla: Authority discovery in browserid (2015), http://mozilla.
github.io/id-specs/docs/protocol/discovery/
[24] Newman, B., Lingamneni, S.: CS259 Final Project: OpenID (Ses-
sion Swapping Attack) (2008), http://www.stanford.edu/class/cs259/
projects/cs259-final-newmanb-slingamn/report.pdf
[25] Nir Goldshlager: How I Hacked Any Facebook Account...Again!
(March 2013), http://www.nirgoldshlager.com/2013/03/
how-i-hacked-any-facebook-accountagain.html
[26] Nir Goldshlager: How I Hacked Facebook OAuth To Get Full
Permission On Any Facebook Account (Without App "Allow" In-
teraction) (February 2013), http://www.nirgoldshlager.com/2013/02/
how-i-hacked-facebook-oauth-to-get-full.html
[27] Olivo, O., Dillig, I., Lin, C.: Detecting and exploiting second order
denial-of-service vulnerabilities in web applications. In: Proceedings
of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communi-
cations Security. pp. 616–628. ACM (2015)
[28] ONsec Lab: Ssrf bible. cheatsheet (Au-
gust 2014), https://docs.google.com/document/d/
1v1TkWZtrhzRLy0bYXBcdLUedXGb9njTNIJXa3u9akHM/edit?
pli=1#
[29] openid connect: Discovery / Security Considerations: CSRF at-
tack on user input identifier (2015), https://bitbucket.org/openid/
connect/issues/979/discovery-security-considerations-csrf, accessed:
25.08.2015
[30] OpenID Foundation: Openid foundation leadership, http://openid.net/
foundation/leadership/
[31] RFC6749, I.: The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework
[32] Somorovsky, J., Mayer, A., Schwenk, J., Kampmann, M., Jensen, M.:
On breaking saml: Be whoever you want to be. In: 21st USENIX
Security Symposium. Bellevue, WA (Aug 2012)
[33] specs@openid.net: OpenID Authentication 2.0 – Final (Dec 2007),
https://openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-2_0.html
[34] Sun, S.T., Beznosov, K.: The devil is in the (implementation) details:
an empirical analysis of oauth sso systems. In: Proceedings of the
2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security.
pp. 378–390. ACM (2012)
[35] Sun, S.T., Hawkey, K., Beznosov, K.: Systematically breaking and
fixing OpenID security: Formal analysis, semi-automated empirical
evaluation, and practical countermeasures. Computers & Security
31(4), 465–483 (2012), http://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/journals/compsec/
compsec31.html#SunHB12
[36] The OpenID Foundation (OIDF): OpenID Connect Core 1.0 (Febru-
ary 2014), http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html
[37] The OpenID Foundation (OIDF): OpenID Connect
Discovery 1.0 (February 2014), http://openid.net/specs/
openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html
[38] The OpenID Foundation (OIDF): OpenID Connect Dynamic
Client Registration 1.0 (February 2014), http://openid.net/specs/
openid-connect-registration-1_0.html
[39] The OpenID Foundation (OIDF): How is OpenID Connect different
from OpenID 2.0 and how does it overcome the problems experienced
with OpenID 2.0? (2015), http://openid.net/connect/faq/
[40] Tsyrklevich, E., Tsyrklevich, V.: Single Sign-On for
the Internet: A Security Story (July and August 2007),
https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-07/Tsyrklevich/
Whitepaper/bh-usa-07-tsyrklevich-WP.pdf
[41] Wang, R., Chen, S., Wang, X.: Signing Me onto Your Accounts
through Facebook and Google: A Traffic-Guided Security Study of
Commercially Deployed Single-Sign-On Web Services. In: Proceed-
ings of the 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. pp. 365–
379. SP ’12, IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC, USA (2012),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SP.2012.30
[42] Wang, R., Zhou, Y., Chen, S., Qadeer, S., Evans, D., Gurevich, Y.:
Explicating SDKs: Uncovering Assumptions Underlying Secure Au-
thentication and Authorization. In: Proceedings of the 22Nd USENIX
Conference on Security. pp. 399–414. SEC’13, USENIX Associa-
tion, Berkeley, CA, USA (2013), http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=
2534766.2534801
[43] Xing, L., Chen, Y., Wang, X., Chen, S.: InteGuard: Toward Automatic
Protection of Third-Party Web Service Integrations. In: Proceedings
of 20th Annual Network & Distributed System Security Symposium
(2013)
[44] Yuchen Zhou, D.E.: Automated Testing of Web Applications for
Single Sign-On Vulnerabilities. In: 23rd USENIX Security Sym-
posium (USENIX Security 14). USENIX Association, San Diego,
CA (Aug 2014), https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity14/
technical-sessions/presentation/zhou
